JAPAN DISPATCHES THE SDF TO IRAQ

On December 18 Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirô approved the plan drafted by the Defense Agency for deployment of units from Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to Iraq. Based on this, Minister of State for Defense Ishiba Shigeru promptly directed the three branches of the SDF—Ground, Maritime, and Air—to prepare for deployment, and as a first step he ordered the dispatch of an advance unit from the Air Self-Defense Force. On December 26, this advance team of 48 members set off for Kuwait, where the ASDF is to set up its operating base, and Qatar. Members of the Ground Self-Defense Force are slated to enter Iraq in January and commence full-scale reconstruction activities there in April. This is the first time for units of the SDF to be deployed in a region where combat is still underway.

The direct basis for the dispatch was the approval by the cabinet on December 9 of a “basic plan” as stipulated under the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, which was passed by the National Diet last July. In a press conference immediately after the December 9 cabinet decision, Prime Minister Koizumi expressed his determination that Japan fulfill its international responsibility, stating, “I believe that, as a responsible member of the international community, Japan must also fulfill its responsibility in the creation of an environment that will allow the people of Iraq to work to rebuild their own country with optimism. For that purpose, I have decided that there is a need for Japan to provide not only financial assistance, but also material assistance and personnel assistance, including the dispatch of the SDF.” And he sought to win the support of the domestic public for his decision with a reference to the lofty sentiments set forth in the Constitution, stating, “I believe that . . . the very principles of Japan and our aspirations as a nation are being questioned. I believe that it is in fact the very spirit of the people of Japan that is being tested.”

According to the basic plan, the GSDF is to undertake humanitarian and reconstruction assistance involving medical services, water supply, and rehabilitation and maintenance of schools and other public facilities in southeastern Iraq; the ASDF is to transport members of the GSDF and supplies and materials for them using airports in Kuwait and southeastern Iraq; and the Maritime Self-Defense Force is to transport and supply the GSDF through operations in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. The plan also allows for the SDF to provide medical services, transportation, and other ancillary services for forces from other countries responding to the UN call for reconstruction support in Iraq. In addition, civilian support personnel are to assist with medical services and the rehabilitation and maintenance of necessary facilities.

Japan was relatively quick to express its support for the US-led attack on Iraq; back in February 2003, when many members of the UN Security Council were expressing reluctance to approve a new resolution that would effectively authorize such an attack, Japan openly declared its backing. And in May, when Koizumi met with US President George W. Bush, he promised Japanese help with the postwar reconstruction effort, implicitly suggesting that this would include dispatch of the SDF. But the situation in Iraq continued to be unexpectedly unstable, and in August the local UN headquarters in Baghdad was the target of a terrorist attack that cost the life of Special Representative Sergio Vieira de Mello. The US occupation forces remained under constant pressure, suffering casualties on almost a daily basis, and a suicide bombing on November 12 killed 19 members of the Italian contingent participating in the stabilization and reconstruction effort.

When the Iraq Assistance Special Measures Law was enacted in July, the government emphasized that the SDF were to be dispatched to noncombat areas where danger was slight, and in the face of these subsequent developments it repeatedly postponed making concrete moves toward deployment, sensing that it would be impossible to win public understanding for the move. On November 29 the killing of two Japanese diplomats in a terrorist attack further highlighted the instability of the situation in Iraq. But in the wake of these deaths the government decided to go ahead with formulation of a basic plan under the law, citing the importance of maintaining Japan’s alliance with the United States and cooperating with the international community, and it moved to dispatch the initial team from the ASDF just before the end of the year.

For the Japanese, the debate over sending the SDF in Iraq has its roots in Article 9 of the present Constitution, which renounces war and the use of military force. Over the decades since it adopted this Constitution shortly after World War II, Japan has asserted its right to defend itself militarily, and it has established the SDF for this purpose, but it has never agreed to send its forces overseas to participate in combat activities together with allies. The government’s position has been that this would constitute “collective self-defense,” which it has judged not to be constitutionally permissible.

In line with this position, Japan took no part in the 1991 Gulf War, though it provided a major financial contribution in support of the coalition effort and dispatched minesweepers to the Persian Gulf after the fighting was over. Also in 1991, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who was then the secretary general of the UN, authored a report calling for the strengthening of the UN’s military capabilities in the post–Cold War world. In 1992, stung by the lack of appreciation for its contribution the previous year and feeling the need to play a more active role in international cooperation for peace, the government secured enactment of the International Peace Cooperation Law, which made it possible to send the SDF to take part in international peacekeeping operations. But under a freeze that was imposed on SDF participation in the core duties of peacekeeping forces (units involved in direct enforcement of peace settlements), Japan’s involvement in peacekeeping operations was limited in practice to rear-area support.

Starting with the dispatch of minesweepers from the MSDF to the Persian Gulf in April 1991, the SDF have been sent on a number of overseas missions, mainly in connection with UN peacekeeping activities. To cite the major examples, the GSDF was sent to Cambodia in 1992, Mozambique in 1993, Zaire in 1994, the Golan Heights in 1996, and East Timor in 2002; the ASDF was sent to West Timor in 1999; and the MSDF was sent to the Indian Ocean in 2001. But all these operations have been in noncombat areas and involved mainly the provision of logistical support.

The dispatch of the SDF to Iraq also involves mainly logistical support, but many oppose it on the grounds that the forces are being sent to an area where they may get involved in military conflict, which under the Constitution they are not supposed to do. And underlying this opposition are doubts about whether it was right for the United States and Britain to attack Iraq in the first place, along with concerns that the government is quietly broadening the scope for use of the SDF overseas under cover of the Japan-US alliance.

Those who support the government’s decision cite the importance of making a “visible” contribution, including the dispatch of personnel, instead of just offering financial help. They assert that it will promote the further strengthening of Japan’s alliance with the United States, and they also see it as necessary in terms of fulfilling the international commitment the prime minister has made.

The deployment of the SDF to Iraq and its environs represents a new juncture for Japan’s foreign policy in terms of taking action as a member of an international security community bound together by common values and standards of behavior. But public support for this move is far from solid. In a poll conducted by the Asahi Shimbun on December 10–11, only 34% of respondents supported the dispatch of the SDF, while 55% were opposed. And the results of a survey by the Yomiuri Shimbun as announced on December 12 revealed that just 41% considered Japan-US relations to be “good,” a drop of 13 percentage points from a year before, while 26% said that the bilateral relationship was “deteriorating,” a 10-point increase; some 45% declared that they “don’t trust the United States,” up 6 points. These results suggest that the war in Iraq has cast a shadow on Japanese public opinion. Even within the ruling coalition, opinion was divided on whether to send the SDF. The government took this move before the domestic debate on the issue had been completed. This point is likely to become a source of further contention.

In this section we present two articles treating foreign policy issues Japan faces in the aftermath of the war in Iraq. The first is one that I myself wrote several months ago, well before the government finally gave the go-ahead for sending units of the SDF to take part in the reconstruction of Iraq. My concern at that point was that the instability in Iraq was causing Tokyo to be overly hesitant in following through on its promise to provide assistance. Now the first steps in the dispatch of troops have been taken. But it remains true, as I point out in the article, that there is much more Japan can and should be doing on its own initiative for the benefit of the Japan-US alliance and indeed the whole world.

The other article, by Nishihara Masashi, is a warning against a proposal some Americans have been entertaining with evidently little thought: the conclusion of a nonaggression pact between the United States and North Korea. As Nishihara points out, such a pact could unintendedly produce various adverse consequences and might even destabilize Japan’s own security. He advises Tokyo to do all it can to assist Washington in its negotiations with Pyongyang and to prevent any weakening of the Japan-US alliance. (Watanabe Hirotaka, Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies)

© 2004 Japan Echo Inc.