The Misconstrued Shift in Japan’s Foreign Policy

Since the end of the Cold War, Japan has been perceived by its Asian neighbors and many other countries to be seeking a return to its former major-power status. Domestic calls for Japan to become a "normal country" have been equated with a swing to the right and a desire to exert its military will on others. This is a gross misunderstanding and distortion of Japan’s foreign policy.

There is no denying that changes have occurred. One major transformation is that political initiatives to amend the Constitution are no longer taboo. Most Japanese recognize, though, that the proposed revisions have virtually nothing in common with pre–World War II aspirations to be ranked among the world’s major powers. In fact, the security arrangements with the United States that effectively restrict Japan’s strategic independence have consistently grown stronger in the post–Cold War era, rather than weaker.

This essay argues that the most significant changes in Japan’s foreign policy have been its deepening participation in activities to ensure international security. Indeed, the principal motivations for seeking to amend the strictly pacifist Constitution of Japan have been to enable fuller engagement in UN peacekeeping and other multinational activities. And as many opinion polls show, support for amendment derives chiefly from the public’s desire for a "proactive pacifism" that would enable Japan to play a bigger role in maintaining the peace and stability of the international community. The "normal country" argument advanced in the 1990s by Ozawa Ichirô (elected president of the Democratic Party of Japan in April 2006) arose from Japan’s foreign policy debacle in the 1991 Gulf War. Its gist was to enable Japan to physically participate in international security activities, just like any other "normal country." Reading a hidden nationalist agenda to return to major-power status in this argument is virtually impossible.

That said, there must also be recognition of the fact that the misunderstandings and distortions about nationalism in Japan may have been fueled by unguarded or suggestive political statements. Even if such statements are not prompted by a long-term state strategy, other countries, particularly those in Asia, are wont to perceive unrevealed strategies behind them. What these statements really reveal, though, is frustration with various aspects of the postwar setup. Such frustrations are increasingly being vented haphazardly out of resentment toward developments in China or dissatisfaction over the "postwar consensus," which I describe below. Paradoxically, such isolated expressions have gained a degree of public support precisely because of a lack of a strategy to channel such frustrations. Were a desire to revive Japan’s prewar aspirations actually articulated clearly, the Japanese public would be the first to reject it.

Japan’s neighbors remain unconvinced, however. They continue to speak of an "understanding" about a strategy that simply does not exist and formulate policies on the basis of this premise. This has angered not just conservative politicians in Japan but also many members of the general public. When such anger takes a nationalistic tone, the "understanding" of Japan’s neighbors then turns into a firm "conviction," triggering a vicious circle of antagonistic emotions unaccompanied by any serious material conflict of interest. The issue of history, needless to say, remains the chief bone of contention. To gain an accurate understanding of the changes in Japan’s post–Cold War foreign policy, it is instructive to consider the significance of the "postwar consensus" built over the years and to explore how the vicious circle of antagonism emerged.

THE POSTWAR CONSENSUS

Japan’s foreign policy—as well as its state policy as a whole—after the nation’s cataclysmic defeat in World War II was built on deep remorse over its aggression in China and other Asian countries. Prewar military leaders did not even regard their strategies as being aggressive, and they were thus drawn into a war that pitted Japan against most of the Western world. Such a situation was a natural outcome of the self-centered military vision of the world that prevailed at the time. Postwar Japan rejected this highly ideological war mentality and deeply repented the folly of such a policy.

Many in this defeated country embraced the pacifist postwar Constitution as the cornerstone of a fresh start. In 1946, when the new Constitution was enacted, Nationalist China was seen as emerging as the core of a postwar Asian order, and it was greeted into the United Nations as a permanent member of the Security Council. A disarmed Japan—symbolized by its war-renouncing Constitution—was an organic component of this postwar order.

After 1947, however, the United States and the Soviet Union increasingly locked horns over the shaping of the postwar global order; this confrontation eventually led to the polarization of international relations during the Cold War and the triumph of the Communists in China. Already by this time, unarmed neutrality had become an unrealistic option for Japan, and the constitutional renunciation of military potential had lost its international relevance. Even so, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru (1946–47, 1948–54) doggedly resisted Washington’s exhortations to rearm, and the public supported him. Since it was becoming clear that Japan could not ensure its security without arms, an alliance with the United States was born in 1951.

This was the start of the "Yoshida line" of foreign policy, built on the twin rails of the war-renouncing Constitution and the Japan-US Security Treaty. In adopting this policy, Japan forswore any ambition of winning a place among the major powers through the exercise of force. The policy thus eloquently expressed Japan’s postwar consensus, built on remorse over the country’s wartime aggression in Asia. Japan was born anew and embarked on a fresh start with the 1951 signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The treaty served as the foundation for the Yoshida line, which became an integral part of the "San Francisco setup" that contributed heavily to Japan’s postwar peace and prosperity.

As I describe below, the recent changes in Japan’s foreign policy represent an extension of this consensus; the new security environment engendered by the end of the Cold War has spurred the transformation of the isolationist pacifism Japan maintained during the era of East-West rivalry into a more proactive and internationalist pacifism seeking participation in multinational security arrangements. It is within this context that the public is showing greater support for a revision of the Constitution, particularly the total renunciation of military potential in Article 9.

A VICIOUS CIRCLE

As I noted above, there is little understanding in other countries of the true motives behind the post–Cold War shift in Japan’s foreign policy. Most countries view the change warily, severely isolating Japan in international discourse. At the root of the skepticism is the persisting issue of history.

Some conservatives have begun making arguments that, even if unconsciously, appear to advocate a revolutionary course of action that would contravene the postwar consensus and the peace formulated in San Francisco. But I would repeat that this is fundamentally nothing more than the venting of built-up frustrations and is not a part of an explicit strategy to turn back the clock. If anything, such outbursts serve to demonstrate that the nationalists have no integrated strategy. Were Japan’s foreign policy to truly embrace the view of history represented by Yasukuni Shrine and the arguments against the legitimacy of the Tokyo Trial (International Military Tribunal for the Far East), Japan would infuriate not only South Korea and China but also ultimately the United States. Not even the most diehard proponents of a revisionist history are willing or prepared to accept such consequences.

Chinese and Korean concerns about Japan’s turn to the right and rising militarism are fueled by historical images of a Japan defiantly making an all-out effort to break the established world order in the 1930s and early 1940s. But knowledgeable people in those countries fully understand that the postwar consensus remains firmly rooted in Japanese society. Even they are convinced, though, that there are some nationalists who are bent on once again exerting Japan’s traditional and historical impulses on other peoples through military force. This is the reason they see a common, right-leaning thread connecting such isolated events as the visits to Yasukuni Shrine by Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirô, the dispatch of Self-Defense Forces personnel to Iraq, the territorial dispute with South Korea over Takeshima (Dokdo to the Koreans), the friction with China over development of gas fields in the East China Sea, and Japan’s bid for permanent membership on the UN Security Council.

And in fact such a misunderstanding is encouraged by political leaders in Japan who, out of a perceived need to take an "assertive" or "independent" stance toward China and South Korea, keep repeating statements that only demonstrate their lack of understanding of or appreciation for foreign policy strategy. Most detrimental is their refusal to recognize the fact that history is an issue of great strategic importance for Japan’s foreign policy. Their assertions are self-defeating, for they only further isolate Japan and greatly damage its national interests.

The postwar consensus, as mentioned above, remains firmly grounded in Japan’s modern society, and charges of a turn to the right or a revival of military ambitions are clearly off the mark. Even Prime Minister Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine are made within the framework of this consensus, as demonstrated by his repeated remarks to that effect, but this has been completely misunderstood. At the grass-roots level, relations that reflect this consensus have been steadily deepened with the civil societies of not only South Korea and other Asian countries but also China. That Japan’s elected leaders are straining such relationships with their thoughtless remarks and wrecking friendships built up over the years is truly a tragedy for Japan.

Domestic debate over the question of history has been narrowly and emotionally restricted to the issues raised by Chinese and Korean accusations, giving rise to a phenomenon whereby the backlash of the nationalists has been gaining increasing public support. If we break the vicious circle of emotionally charged criticism and countercriticism, the vast majority of the public will undoubtedly identify strongly with the postwar consensus. This will enable a rectification of relations with Asian neighbors and the rebuilding of a foreign policy strategy that also addresses ties with Washington. Such a strategy would not require a major revision of the postwar consensus, even if it involves amending Article 9.

"MIDDLE POWER" DIPLOMACY

Breaking the vicious circle naturally requires a deepening of mutual understanding. But there are also issues that Japan must address on its own, the most significant being to articulate a comprehensive and long-term foreign policy strategy. In retrospect, Japan’s foreign policy over the years since World War II has been predicated on the postwar consensus and consistently been one of a "middle power." Building a society on the core values of freedom and democracy, Japan relinquished an approach premised on the use of military force and other means of physical coercion. It withdrew from direct participation in power politics among the world’s great powers and worked instead for the maintenance and improvement of multilateral frameworks. Most Japanese have a clear understanding that this approach is built on a rejection of Japan’s past use of military power to achieve its self-centered aims. This is why postwar Japan embraced a pacifist Constitution and pursued a foreign policy founded on security arrangements with Washington.

But with the collapse of the Cold War setup, Article 9 became, if anything, a hindrance to carrying out a more transparent middle-power diplomacy and to making an appropriate contribution to international security. This became most apparent in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War; since then, the role of the Self-Defense Forces has expanded beyond the traditional safeguarding of Japan’s territorial borders to participation in international peacekeeping activities. This does not signal Japan’s desire to return to military-power status, as China and South Korea contend. In fact, the arguments in favor of revising the Constitution derive from a wish to deepen Japan’s multinational security commitments and are thus an integral part of the pursuit of middle-power diplomacy.

By launching into discourse of a looming "Chinese threat" and by advocating a bigger security role for Japan and the SDF, Japan’s politicians have wildly distorted the country’s image and have made the political environment less conducive to a constitutional amendment. China may indeed come to represent a threat in due time from a purely military point of view, but the recent voicing of concern has come not from policymakers at the Defense Agency and other military specialists, who tend be very cautious about making such statements, but from politicians. This is the reverse of what one would normally expect and exposes the confused state of the country’s defense strategy. In the United States, for instance, the Pentagon clearly spells out the need to provide for the military threat China may represent, while the White House engages the Beijing leadership on the need for strategic coexistence. This is another vivid indication of the strategic vacuum in which Japan’s political leaders have been operating.

Our leaders should be held responsible for not developing a more realistic strategy. While an ideology of pacifism held sway during the Cold War years, the pendulum may appear to have swung to the opposite direction, and today there is greater support for ideological statements colored by nationalism. But ideology cannot generate practical answers. Building a realistic, long-term approach as a middle power is the way for Japan to harmonize the ideals of the postwar consensus with its actual position in the global community. This is not impossible, for Japanese security policy since the end of the Cold War has in fact been taking a path of internationalism as an extension of the postwar consensus.

THE CHANGE IN JAPAN’S SECURITY POLICY

The first major change following the Cold War came with Japan’s participation in multinational security initiatives, most notably UN peacekeeping operations. The administration in Tokyo was shocked to learn that its financial contributions to the allied forces during the Gulf War—which were so large as to require a domestic tax hike—went largely unappreciated internationally. This taught the government the importance of contributing with personnel, and in June 1992, after heated national debate and considerable confusion in the Diet, the International Peace Cooperation Law was enacted. In September that year, members of the SDF were dispatched abroad for the first time to take part in the mission of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia.

The second change was the reconfirmation of Japan-US security ties. Washington began to view Japan’s sudden inclination for multilateral security arrangements with anxiety, believing that this might destabilize the bilateral alliance. In March 1993 North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and in 1994 the Clinton administration seriously contemplated launching air strikes against suspected nuclear weapons development sites in that country. This could easily have touched off a second Korean War, but the Japanese and US governments had no established rules on military cooperation in the case of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula. They thus immediately began work on revising the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation, which were originally drafted in 1978 and did not cover how the two countries would cooperate in a security emergency in the Far East.

The new guidelines were established in September 1997, preceded by the formulation in Japan of the National Defense Program Outline in November 1995 and by the issuance of the Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security in April 1996. Japan’s strategic independence was curtailed under the new post–Cold War security environment, while the alliance with the United States was increasingly reinforced.

The third change was the awakening to the need to address the traditional issue of national defense. Changes in this area have been chiefly responsible for clouding how security policy has actually shifted since the Cold War. China increasingly came to be viewed with wariness in the late 1990s, and North Korea emerged as a veritable threat following the test firing of Taepodong missiles, intrusions of suspected North Korean spy vessels into Japan’s territorial waters, and the revival of memories of the abduction of Japanese nationals by North Korean agents. Wild charges over perceived security threats have been made in Japan, particularly following the 1993 collapse of the "1955 setup" (which was dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party and the opposition Japan Socialist Party) and the regression of postwar pacifism.

While there is now heightened awareness of defense issues in Japan, this has generated a lot of talk without leading to much concrete policy action. In fact, the defense budget has been shrinking over the past few years, in spite of a popular image to the contrary. The new National Defense Program Outline adopted in December 2004, moreover, gives less attention to traditional national defense in terms of both policy and resource distribution—including budget appropriations and equipment—and argues, rather, that international security is an issue of great importance. The sequence of the changes outlined above (fuller participation in international security activities and strengthening of security ties with Washington) is significant, for the order in which these changes occurred following the Cold War is suggestive of the internationalist nature of changes in foriegn policy.

PARTNERSHIP WITH SEOUL

These changes in foreign policy should be construed as attempts by Japan to consolidate what is, in practical terms, middle-power diplomacy. Japan religiously adhered to an isolationist pacifism during the Cold War and was not even capable of acting as a middle power. The changes over the past decade and a half should thus be regarded as demonstrating the essence of its efforts to become a more "normal" country. And while conventional wisdom sees four major powers—Japan included—surrounding the Korean Peninsula in Northeast Asia, Japan’s security policy has much more in common with that of South Korea than with those of the United States, China, and Russia. Thus, a more realistic description of the geopolitical situation in Northeast Asia would be three major powers encircling Japan and the Korean Peninsula. While Japan’s nationalists voice a determination to remain among the four regional powers, this is a futile quest without a coherent strategy.

Recognition of these geopolitical dynamics holds the key to advancing security cooperation between Japan and South Korea as equal partners. Such a collaborative relationship would greatly empower the bilateral ties that have formed at the grass-roots level based on the values common to both countries. The growing chill induced by hostility over historical issues is preventing the two countries from tapping the deep ties that already exist. This is a big loss, not just for both countries but also for Asia as a whole, as Japan and South Korea are the two countries that can play an integrating role in Asia akin to that performed by Germany and France in Europe. If they can share a vision and agenda for Asian integration, international relations in East Asia could undergo a paradigm shift.

As I emphasized above, Japan is ready to fulfill such a role following the swing toward internationalism in its post–Cold War foreign policy. Although nationalist sentiment seems to be on the rise in Japan, it does not involve concrete material conflicts with other nations; rather it is the product of a vicious circle of negative emotions. The nationalists within Japan draw their rhetorical power from this vicious circle. The most effective way of once again marginalizing such impulses is for political leaders to steadily advance regional cooperation that is firmly grounded in reality. This requires an accurate understanding of the changes in Japan’s post–Cold War foreign policy and a proper grasp of Japan’s role and position in East Asia.

Translated from an original article in Japanese written for Japan Echo.

© 2006 Japan Echo Inc.