FROM THE EDITOR

FUKUDA’S FIRST THREE MONTHS I am writing this column on Christmas Eve, almost exactly three months since Fukuda Yasuo became prime minister. Since his inauguration the new prime minister has already traveled to Washington, where he met with US President George W. Bush, and to Singapore, where his busy schedule included the ASEAN+3 gathering (at which the leaders of China, Japan, and South Korea meet with their counterparts from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), the East Asia Summit (among the leaders of ASEAN+3 plus Australia, India, and New Zealand), a Japan-ASEAN summit, and a trilateral summit with his counterparts from China and South Korea. And in a couple of days he is scheduled to visit China. Meanwhile, his administration has compiled its draft budget for fiscal 2008 (April 2008 to March 2009).

So far, however, Fukuda has not been able to secure enactment of a renewed mandate for the refueling operation conducted by the Maritime Self-Defense Force in the Indian Ocean for the naval vessels of nations participating in antiterrorism operations. Deliberations on the proposed legislation have remained stalled, partly because of the distraction from revelations of serious misbehavior in the Ministry of Defense. It is hardly surprising that the administration has been experiencing rough sailing given the current composition of the National Diet. Though Fukuda’s Liberal Democratic Party and its coalition partner, the New Kômeitô, hold over two-thirds of the seats in the House of Representatives, they are now in the minority in the House of Councillors, where last summer’s election put Ozawa Ichirô’s Democratic Party of Japan in effective control. Ozawa is firmly opposed to the Indian Ocean refueling operation, and we had hoped to carry a translation of an article that appeared in the November issue of Sekai in which he set forth his position on this and related issues. Unfortunately, though, we were not able to secure the author’s permission. So here I would like to introduce the main points of his argument as accurately as I can in a short space.

OZAWA’S STANCE ON SECURITY There is no contradiction (Ozawa asserts) between Japan’s UN-centered policy stance and our country’s alliance with the United States; maintaining both is the way to preserve Japan’s security. The United States cannot preserve world peace by itself; this is clear from the situation in Afghanistan. The only way to preserve the peace of the world is by pooling the strength of the international community in line with the ideals of the Constitution of Japan and the Charter of the United Nations. Our country must also be ready to stand at the forefront of efforts to preserve world peace and assume its share of responsibility for this endeavor.

Over the decades since the adoption of Japan’s post–World War II Constitution, various opinions have been advanced concerning its interpretation, particularly with respect to Article 9, renouncing war and the use of force. This has become the biggest issue for Japan’s national security policy. We have interpreted Article 9 to mean that Japan can exercise the right of self-defense (the use of force) only in cases where it has been directly attacked or where it may be attacked if it does nothing about a situation in a nearby area. The Constitution also sets forth a lofty commitment to world peace and Japan’s desire to occupy an honored place in international society. To fulfill these objectives, Japan must actively participate in UN peacekeeping operations.

The Japanese government has interpreted UN operations as amounting to the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, taking the position that participating in operations involving the use of military force under Article 42 of the UN Charter would violate Article 9 of the Constitution. So why does the government think it is permissible for Japanese forces to support the US forces as they lead "Operation Enduring Freedom" in Afghanistan? The Constitution should be interpreted to mean that Japan may not dispatch military forces to cooperate with the exercise of self-defense by the United States or any other country. But participation in UN operations, even if they involve the use of force, is not unconstitutional; in fact, it is in keeping with the philosophy of the Constitution.

Fighting against terrorism does not mean cooperating with US military activities. The heart of the fight is to take a firm stance against terrorism on every front, starting with immigration and financial controls. If I (Ozawa) had the authority to decide on foreign policy and security policy, I would like to have Japan participate in ISAF, the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. In addition, I would note that what underlies terrorism is poverty, a fundamental issue for humankind. Most important is to overcome the problems of poverty and stabilize people’s lives.

The above is a summary of Ozawa’s position.

A GRAND COALITION? The ruling coalition recently extended the current extraordinary session of the Diet through January 15. If the opposition-controlled House of Councillors, which is now deliberating the government’s bill for renewal of the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law (the legal basis for the MSDF refueling operation, which expired on November 1), rejects the measure, as it is expected to, the government is now ready to enact it by having the House of Representatives approve it a second time with a two-thirds majority, thereby overriding the upper house rejection. So by the time this issue of Japan Echo is in readers’ hands, barring some extraordinary sudden development, the law should be in force.

Aside from the issue of the refueling operation, though, it is most unfortunate that the split between the lower house and upper house in the Diet is forcing postponement of action to deal with a variety of crucial matters relating to Japan’s future. For example, in mid-December the ruling coalition approved a document outlining the revisions of the tax system the government will seek to enact for fiscal 2008, but even though this document included a reference to the consumption tax as an important source of revenue for the social security system, it made no reference at all to the scale or timing of a hike in the rate of this tax (currently 5%). The drafters of the proposed revisions also put off fundamental reform of the tax system as a whole, including individual income taxes and corporate taxes. The proposed package thus lacks substance; even so, it is likely to face rough going in the regular Diet session starting in January, because the ruling party and the opposition are at odds over some of the particulars, such as the handling of revenues currently earmarked for road construction.

The only way to break through the current legislative impasse is by changing the current political configuration, either through a regrouping of forces across the current party lines or the formation of a grand coalition including Ozawa’s DPJ. In mid-autumn we saw what we might call a rehearsal for the launch of such a coalition. Fukuda and Ozawa met on October 30 and again on November 2, and at their second meeting they reached a broad agreement on an alliance that would bring the DPJ into the government. But later the same day the other executives of the DPJ rejected the proposal, prompting Ozawa to offer his resignation from the party presidency. At first there was speculation that he would bolt from the DPJ with a group of his supporters and join the LDP-Kômeitô coalition. If he were able to bring 17 members of the opposition camp in the House of Councillors over to the government’s side, the ruling coalition would recapture control of the upper house. But the other leaders in the party pulled out all the stops in a drive to block such a split, and in the end, with this option unavailable, Ozawa decided to withdraw his resignation and stay on at the helm of the DPJ.

The public did not react favorably to this rehearsal. Many apparently think the next move should be a lower house general election to determine the popular will. But the Fukuda-Ozawa agreement, however short-lived, at least showed people that a grand coalition is one option for overcoming the current split in the Diet. I believe that we will see more discussion of this possibility between now and the next general election, which will probably be called sometime before the end of 2008. (Shiraishi Takashi)

© 2008 Japan Echo Inc.