REASSESSING JAPAN’S DIPLOMATIC OPTIONS

Two foreign policy issues are addressed in this issue of Japan Echo. The first is the pursuit of mutual benefits in Sino-Japanese relations, explored in a dialogue between Feng Zhaokui and Okabe Tatsumi. Feng is a former deputy director of the Institute of Japanese Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and currently a visiting professor at Aichi University. Okabe is a leading figure in the field of Chinese studies in Japan and a former Japan chair of the Japan-China Friendship Committee for the 21st Century. The second topic is the reshaping of Japanese diplomacy befitting the country’s status as a middle-ranking power, a call advanced by Keiô University Professor Soeya Yoshihide.

Feng was a leading proponent of the "new thinking on relations with Japan," a much-talked-about development that swept through China in 2002 and 2003. References to this "new thinking" vanished from the Chinese media following Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirô’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine and the resultant popular backlash in China. Feng notes, though, those "with an active interest in Sino-Japanese ties were somewhat reassured to see that even a very conservative Japanese politician like [Koizumi’s successor] Abe [Shinzô] judged the development of the bilateral relationship to be in Japan’s national interest and acted accordingly." Okabe points out, however, that moves to create a "mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests" are being hampered by negative emotions on both sides.

As a sidelight to this discussion, I would point to the results of an opinion survey on foreign policy that has been conducted annually by Japan’s Cabinet Office. The survey results from October 2007 concerning relations with China can be summarized as follows. Asked whether they feel an affinity with China, 34.0% of the respondents said that they do (including 27.3% who said they feel an affinity "to some extent"), while 63.5% said they do not (including 36.0% reporting they "do not feel much affinity"). Queried on the quality of the bilateral relationship, 26.4% believed it was sound (including 24.5% feeling that it was "relatively sound"), while 68.0% thought that it was poor (including 45.6% saying it was "relatively poor"). Prime Minister Abe’s October 2006 trip to China seems to have contributed to a positive shift in the 2007 results by comparison with the findings of the previous year’s survey.

Longer-term trends are shown in the attached graph. Through 1988 respondents harboring a positive view of China far outnumbered those who saw China in a negative light, but from 1989 to 2004 the respective shares began moving closer together, particularly after the visit to Japan by Chinese President Jiang Zemin in 1998. Since 2005, moreover, the naysayers have become predominant. I am not familiar with any corresponding surveys in China, but I would guess that a similar pattern would emerge in Chinese sentiments toward Japan. There has been a slight thawing in both countries over the past year, but more time will be needed to fully overcome the vicious cycle of mismanagement of the bilateral relationship by the two countries’ leaders, hostile reactions at the popular level, and the resulting narrowing of policy options at the leadership level.

In Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, published in 2007 by Cornell University Press, Richard Samuels classified me as a "middle power internationalist"–a label that I share with Soeya Yoshihide, the author of the second article in this section. Soeya points to the dangers of the nationalism of the right wing, which had once "been pushed to the margins" but whose voices can now be heard "calling for restoration of Japan’s autonomy and initiative" from the center of the political power structure. He opines that diplomacy "informed by a certain degree of dependence and of limits on initiative is in fact the best practical autonomous strategy for Japan." I am of the same opinion, but I remain skeptical of the feasibility of building networks strategically at the middle-power level, as he advocates. As Soeya notes, Japan succeeded in "building a solid middle-level infrastructure in its relations with ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations]" during the 1980s and 1990s. But since the 1997—98 Asian currency and financial crisis our country has pursued all sorts of East Asian cooperative arrangements, and this approach has undermined the integrated Southeast Asian strategy that was evident earlier.

The inauguration of a new administration in South Korea this year has raised big hopes for the resurrection of the security alliance between Seoul and Washington, progress in three-way strategic talks among Japan, the United States, and South Korea, and the launch of strategic cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul. Ties between Japan and South Korea are still plagued by a number of unresolved issues, though, such as conflicting territorial claims over Takeshima (Dokdo), gaps in perceptions of history, and the lopsided balance of trade in Japan’s favor. These are likely to hinder the building of the sort of bilateral relationship that Soeya foresees, one in which "Japan and South Korea can talk to each other, using the same concepts and words, about the United States, China, and the proper shape of the regional order." (Shiraishi Takashi, Vice-President, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies)

© 2008 Japan Echo Inc.